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I. INTRODUCTION 
The boards of directors of a number of America's largest corporations, 
with household names like American Express, General Motors, 
International Business Machines, K-Mart, and Westinghouse, have 
recently responded to poor corporate performance by essentially 
declaring, "Off with their heads!" and firing their chief executive officers 
("CEOs").2 In many instances, the removal of CEOs has been associat~ 
ed with a significant increase in shareholder wealth.3 However, boards 
of directors frequently allow CEOs to engage in activities that destroy 
shareholder wealth and waste valuable corporate resources before they 
remove these individuals.4 As a result, if boards of directors in these 
situations had fired their company's CEOs earlier or taken other 
corrective action, they may have been able to avoid the loss of 
significant shareholder wealth.5 
The positive relationship between a company's corporate governance 
policies and the likelihood that the board will remove an 
underperforming CEO has attracted increasing attention to these 
policies.6 By focusing on corporate governance issues pertinent to the 
companies in whlch they invest, institutional investors, such as the 
California Public Employees' Retirement Fund ("CalPERS''), 7 the 
largest public pension fund in the United States with assets in excess of 
$.95.5 billion, have found that they can significantly enhance their 
investment returns.9 As a result, institutional investors have placed 
2. See David. J. Denis & Diane K. Denis, Performance Changes Following Top 
Management Dismissals, 50 J. OF FIN. 1029 (1995). 
3. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest,Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strateqy for Dealing 
with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. R.Ev. 857, 882•900 (1993). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 107•254. 
5. See, e.g., A Survey of Corporate Governance: Watching the Boss, ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 29, 1994, at 3 (stating "there is ample evidence of waste that might have been 
avoided had bosses been on a tighter rein."). 
6. Commentators have argued that the "acid test" of a company's corporate 
governance policies is the willingness of its board of directors to fire an underperfonning 
CEO. Grundfest, supra note 3, at 877 (citing Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest 
Proposal/or Improved Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 59, 66 (1992)). 
7. See, e.g., CalPERS Issues Governance Report Cards, IRRC CORP. GOVER· 
NANCE BULL., Apr.-June 1995 (describing how Cal PERS graded its 300 largest portfolio 
companies based on their responses to its corporate governance survey). 
8. Stan Hinden, The Case of the Unretiring Shareholder, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 
1996 (Washington Business section) at 27. 
9. See, e.g., Steven L. Nesbitt, Long•Tenn Rewards from Shareholder Activ~m: 
A Study of the "CalPERS Effect," CONTINENTAL BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN., 
Winter 1994, at 75. See also Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional 
Investors: Evidence from Ca/PERS, 51 J. OF FIN., 227, 244-48 (1996) (shareholder 
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increasing importance on corporate governance related activities. In 
response to the increasing interest of institutional investors in this area, 
publicly traded comfanies in the United States have prioritized corporate 
governance issues.1 
Although certain companies have made significant improvements with 
respect to corporate governance issues, others have not adequately 
addressed these issues.11 As a result, a number of commentators have 
made corporate governance proposals12 that, if implemented, would 
significantly change the status quo. 13 For example, some commenta-
tors, including former Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") Harold Williams14 and Mary Shapiro, 15 and 
Professor Jay Lorsch of the Harvard Business School,16 have recom-
mended that a company should not permit a single individual to serve 
as both its CEO and chairperson of its board of directors ("chair"). 
Alternatively, if a company allows a single individual to serve as its 
CEO and chair, Lorsch and Martin Lipton of the law firm Wachtell, 
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, among others, have asserted that a company's 
board of directors should select a senior independent director to lead the 
independent directors. 17 
wealth increased for targeted finns that adopted Ca!PERS's shareholder resolutions or 
made changes sufficient to warrant a settlement with Ca!PERS but declined for finns 
that resisted change; no statistically significant change in operating perfonnance was 
found across firms). 
10. See, e.g., GENERAL MOTORS CORP., GENERAL MOTORS' BOARD GulDELINES 
ON SIGNIACANT CORPORATE GoVERNANCE ISSUES (1994) (describing the position of 
General Motors on twenty-eight corporate governance issues). 
11. Lowenstein, supra note I, at CI. 
12. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside 
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REY. 863, 865 (1991). 
13. See, e.g., John Daly & Julie Cazzin, A Collision Course: GM Directors 
Overthrow Their Chairman and Take Control of a Troubled Corporate Giant, 
MACLEAN'S, Nov. 9, 1992, at 90. 
14. See Harold M. Williams & Irving S. Shapiro, The 1979 Benjamin F. Fairless 
Memorial Lectures, Power and Accountability: The Changing Role of the Corporate 
Board 18 (Carnegie-Mellon University Press, 1979). 
15. See Robert Sanford, SEC Official Favors Shaking Up Boardrooms, ST. Lorns 
DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1993, at SC. 
16. JAY W. lORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE 
REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 184-87 (1989). 
I 7. See, e.g., Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 6, at 70. Ira M. Millstein of the law 
finn Weil, Gotshal & Manges proposed designating an outside director for a board 
leadership role in 1990. Ira M. Millstein, Corporate Governance in the 1990's, Address 
to the Harvard University School of Government (Apr. 10, 1990). He had previously 
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This Article proposes that the New York Stock Ex.change (''NYSE") 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (''NASD") amend 
their listing policies to require a listed company, in the case of the 
NYSE, and a NASDAQ/NM$ company, in the case of the NASO, to 
disclose in its proxy statement {l) whether or not there is a separate 
independent chair, and if there is not, (2) whether or not its board of 
directors has designated a senior independent director who :functions as 
a leader of its independent directors ("lead director"). For this purpose, 
a director would not be considered independent were he or she either the 
retired CEO or not otherwise deemed independent, applying the 
definitions used in the NYSE and NASO mies requiring an audit 
committee consisting solely of independent directors.18 
Our proposal would not require a company to separate the roles of 
CEO and chair or to designate a lead director. Rather, our proposal 
would allow a company to select the board leadership structure that it 
considers optimal. However, if that structure did not include a separate 
independent chair or lead director, the directors would be required to 
explain in the proxy statement why they believe it to be in the best 
interests of the company and its shareholders to have a single individual 
act as its CEO and chair, or to have a retired CEO or other non-
independent person as chair, without the appointment of an independent 
lead director. 19 
These proposals are designed to encourage directors to select an 
independent chair or a lead director, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that a company's independent directors will not be beholden to the CEO 
and that a company's independent directors will actively monitor and 
evaluate the performance of the CEO and the company on an on-going 
proposed separating the roles of CEO and chair. Winthrop Knowlton & Ira M. Millstein, 
Can the Board of Directors Help the American Corporation Earn the Immortality It 
,Holds So Dear? in JOID,1' R. MEYER & JAMES M. GUSTAFSON, THE U.S. BUSlNESS 
CORPORATION: AN INSTITUTION IN TRANSISTION 186 (1988), 
18. The status of independent directors would be detennined in accordance with 
the definitions used in the NYSE and NASD rules requiring an audit committee 
consisting solely of independent directors. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY 
MANUAL § 303.00 (An audit committee sha11 be "comprised solely of directors 
independent of management and free from any relationship that, in the opinion of its 
Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a 
committee member."). See also NASO MANUAL § 5(c), (CCH) "i[ 1812, at 1579 
("[I]ndependent director shall mean a p-erson other than an officer or employee of the 
company or its subsidiaries or any other individual having a relationship which, in the 
opinion of the board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director."). 
19. Such a rule change would have to be approved by the SEC pursuant to 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. §78s(b) (1995), and Rule 19-4 
promulgated thereunder. 17 C.F.R. §240.19b-4 (1995). 
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basis. Implementation of these proposals would enhance the ability of 
a company's board of directors to make mid-course corrections rather 
than waiting until the company is in a crisis to act. The use of the 
listing requirements as an instrument for change provides a practical and 
easy way to promote the consideration by publicly traded companies of 
board leadership structure and methods for improving it, without 
requiring the SEC to amend its proxy rules or states to amend· their 
corporation laws.20 
This Article consists of five parts. Part II will discuss the rationale for 
our proposal. This part will analyze the existing board leadership 
structure and practices in the United States. Part II will also explore the 
impact that the separation of a company's CEO and chair positions and 
the appointment of a lead director would have on corporate accountabili-
ty. 
Part ill will summarize a recent study, the findings of which suggest 
that independent directors have no effect on corporate performance as 
measured by stock price. This part will then discllss the recent research 
on the relationship between a company separating its chair and CEO 
positions and its performance in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
Part IV will review specific examples of management 
underperformance in publicly traded U.S. companies. These examples 
will demonstrate that many independent directors wait until the company 
is in crisis before removing an underperforming CEO and adopting the 
board practices needed to prevent the abuses of power that resulted from 
the CEO's dominance. This part will focus on well-publicized corporate 
crises, such as the recent allegations of wrongdoing by officers at 
Archer-Daniels-Midland and precipitous losses at Morrison Knudsen, and 
will analyze the confluence of power in these situations within a single 
individual. Moreover, this part will utilize the recent corporate 
governance initiatives at General Motors to illustrate how a company can 
C 
20. Listing requirements have h een used before to promote improved COIJ)orate 
governance and responsibility. For example, the NYSE changed its rules in 1977 to 
require each domestic company with common stock listed on the NYSE to establish and 
maintain an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors. See NEW YORK 
STOCK EXCHANGE CoMPANY MANUAL §303.00, approved by the SEC in In re New 
York Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No, 13,346 (Mar. 9, 1977). The NASD 
subsequently imposed the same requirement on NASDAQ/NMS issuers. See NASD 
MANUAL§ S(D), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) iJ 1812, at 1579. 
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dramatically improve its corporate governance practices and in doing so 
create shareholder value. Lastly, Part IV will discuss the separation of 
the roles of CEO and chair at Compaq Computer to illustrate how a 
company with a separate CEO and chair was able to change course prior 
to reaching a corporate crisis. 
Part V will conclude by discussing the anticipated effect of the 
implementation of this Article's proposal. 
II. THE RATIONALE FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF 
BOARD LEADERSHIP PROPOSAL 
Our proposal involves the use of proxy disclosure as a means of 
promoting thoughtful consideration of board leadership structure, with 
the expectation that it will cause more companies to improve that 
structure by designating an independent chair or a lead director. The use 
of proxy disclosure as a means of inducing change has been used in the 
past in the United States. 
For example, in 1992, the SEC changed the executive compensation 
disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K and made further related 
changes to Schedule 14A and Form 10-K in an attempt to forci;: directors 
to pay more attention to the area of executive compensation and the 
relationship between executive pay and corporate performance.21 For 
the first time, the SEC required public companies to include in their 
proxy statement a report from the compensation committee (or the full 
board if there is no compensation committee) explaining how executive 
compensation was set and the relationship, if any, between corporate 
performance and executive compensation.22 To facilitate a ready 
comparison of pay and performance, the SEC standardized disclosure of 
the total compensation (including stock options) provided to certain top 
executives and required the inclusion of "performance graphs" compar-
ing a company's returns to its shareholders with the returns of the 
market as a whole and their specific industries.23 
21. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, 
Ex.change Act Release No. 31,327, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,032, 57 
Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249), as 
corrected ln Executive Compensation Disclosure, Correction, Securities Act Release No. 
6966, Exchange Act Release No. 31,420, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,085, 
57 Fed. Reg. 53,985 (1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 228) [hereinafter Executive 
Compensation Disclosure]. For a more detailed discussion of these changes and the 
forces that played a role in the SEC's actions, see Tracy Scott Johnson, Pay for 
Perfonnance: Corporate Executive Compensation in the 1990s, 20 DEL. J, CORP, L. 183 
(1995). 
22. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 21. 
23. Id. 
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Similarly, our proposal would require NASDAQ and NYSE companies 
to disclose in their proxy statements their existing board leadership 
structure and their rationale for having such a structure. By requiring 
companies with neither an independent chair nor a lead director to 
explain why they do not consider it to be in the best interests of the 
company and its shareholders to do so, our proposal will provide an 
impetus for directors to select an independent chair or a lead director, 
thereby improving corporate governance. Thus, our proposal falls 
squarely within the U.S. tradition of using proxy disclosure as a means 
to induce enhanced corporate and directorial responsibility. 
Although this proposal would represent a significant change from the 
status quo in the United States, precedent in the United Kingdom 
("U.K.") supports it. The Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance ("Cadbury Report"),24 which Sir 
Adrian Cadbury chaired, stated that in principle the roles of CEO and 
chair should be separate,25 but did not mandate a split. Instead the 
Code of Best Practice included in the Cadbury Report (the "Code of 
Best Practice") provides that if the roles are combined then there must 
be a strong and independent element on the board with a recognized 
senior member.26 The London Stock Exchange ("LSE'') adopted as a 
requirement the Cadbury Report's recommendation27 that every listed 
company domiciled in the United Kingdom disclose in its annual report 
whether it is in compliance with the Code of Best Practice and explain 
any areas of non~compliance.28 Thus, every affected company must 
disclose whether the same person serves as CEO and chair, and, if so, 
whether there is a strong and independent element on the board with a 
24. COMMITIEE ON THE FINANClAL AsPECTS OF CORPORATE GoVERNANCE, THE 
FINANCIAL AsPECTS OF CORPORA1E- GoVERNANCE (1992) [hereinafter CADBURY 
REPORT]. 
25. Id. at 21. 
26. Paragraph 1.2 of the Code of Best Practice provides: 
There should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the bead of 
a company, which will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no 
one individual has unfettered powers of decision. Where the chairperson is 
also the chief executive, it is essential that there should be strong and 
independent element on the board, with a recognized senior member. 
Id. at 58. 
27. Id. at 17. 
28. LoNOON STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING REQUIREMENTS § 12.43(j) {1995). 
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recognized senior member.2si Any U.K. company that has a single 
individual serve as CEO and chair but no strong and independent 
element on the board, with a recognized senior member, must explain 
why it does not split the roles of CEO and chair or appoint a lead 
director.30 
29. Id. In mid•l995, the LSE proposed to limit the required certification to just 
two aspects of the Code of Best Practice included in the Cadbury Report: (1) the 
auditor's certification of the company's going concern status and (2) the directors' 
certification of the adequacy of internal controls. Shareholder activists, however, 
strongly opposed such a change. & a result, it seems unlikely that the LSE will modify 
this requirement before the successor to the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance issues its report, which is not expected before 1997. See Norma 
Cohen, A Taste for Cadbury, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at 19. See also Robert Bruce, 
Slow Journey Ahead for Cadbury Mark II, LoNDON TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. 
30. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING REQUIREMENTS § 12.430) (1995), The 
LSE disclosure requirement applies to any reporting periods ending after June 30, 1993. 
REroRT OF TIIE COMMITIEE ON THE FINANCIAL AsPECTS OF CORPORA TE 00VERNANCE: 
COMPLIANCE wrrn THE CODE OF BEST PRACTICE 9 (1995). In the period from that date 
until December 31, 1994, the majority of the largest 1,550 companies listed on the LSE 
(based on market capitalization) split the roles of CEO and chair. Id. at 16. A majority 
of the companies that combined the roles bad a lead director. The distribution by 
company size, starting with the 100 companies with the largest market capitalization, 
was as follows: 
'"' %SEPAltAT6 % COMBINED 'JI, COMBn;m> WrniAUAD WITllOUT A 
Drucro• LEAD 011\ECI()R 
1-100 82 IS 3 
101-250 83 IS 2 
251-SOO 82 II 7 
501-750 73 17 10 
75{.1000 81 13 • 
1001·1250 74 IS II 
1251•1550 72 5 23 
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The Toronto Stock Exchange ("TSE") bas adopted a similar proposal. 
The TSE has promulgated a set of guidelines pertaining to corporate 
governance and requires companies that do not comply with these 
guidelines to explain their non~compliance.31 One of the TSE corporate 
governance guidelines provides in pertinent part: 
Every board of directors should have in place appropriate structures and 
procedures to ensure that the board can function independently of management 
An appropriate structure would be to (i) appoint a chair of the board who is not 
a member of management with responsibility to ensure the board discharges its 
responsibilities or (ii) adopt alternate means such as assigning this responsibility 
to a committee of the board, such as the governance committee, or to a director, 
sometimes referred to as the "lead director."n 
The existence of a separate chair within a company would reduce the 
CEO's ability to unduly influence and control the board of directors.33 
Commentators have noted that the concentration of power in a single 
individual, who is a company's CEO and chair, has been a factor in 
most recent "corporate disasters."34 If a company has separate individ-
uals serving as the CEO and as the chair, the independent directors will 
have a recognized leader to guide their performance of such critical tasks 
as evaluating the CEO, setting executive compensation, and conducting 
succession planning for the CEO and other members of top management. 
After consultation with the CEO, a separate chair would also set the 
agendas for board meetings and preside over boa:rd meetings, thereby 
controlling the timing and pace of board discussions.35 Along with the 
Id. In contrast, a single individual serves as the CEO and the chair in more than 75% 
of U.S. companies. JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A S1UDY OF 
CORPORATE GoVERNANCE IN FlvE COUNTRIES, 184 (1994). 
31. TORONTO STOCK ExCHANGE CORP. CoMM. 4-20 (1995). 
32. Id. at 4-21 to 4-22. 
33. The reasoning presented in favor of this proposition has been significantly 
influenced by LoRSCH & MACIVER, supra note 16. 
34. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, CORPORATE GoVER-
NANCE ROUNDTABLE 6 (1995) (''In nearly every recent, major corporate disaster there 
was one very powerful individual, always the chair and chief executive, but in some 
cases, chair, chief executive, and a major shareholder as well."). The NACD Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism recommended that boards consider 
formally designating a non-executive chair or other independent board leader. NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, REPORT OF TIIE NACD BLUE RIBBON 
COMJ-DSSION ON DIRECTOR PROFESSIONALISM 4 (1996). 
35. Former SEC Chairman Harold Williams stated that the CEO should not also 
be chair because "[c]ontrol of the agenda and pace of the meeting is a powerful control." 
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other directors, a separate chair would also be active in establishing the 
qualifications for board membership,36 interviewing candidates, and 
selecting new directors.37 Moreover, having a chair who is not also the 
company's CEO would encourage the directors to enga/§e in< more open 
discussions about current problems and practices.3 Lastly, the 
existence of a separate chair serves as a reminder to the CEO that he or 
she reports to, and serves at the pleasure of, the company's board of 
directors.39 
Many executives in the United States oppose the idea of splitting the 
two roles of CEO and chair.40 In the United States, promotion to CEO 
and chair is often viewed as a reward for excellent service and a vote of 
confidence by the board.41 Moreover, in the United States, the majority 
of Fortune 500 companies allow a single individual to serve as their 
Judith H. Dobrzynski, Chairman and CEO: One Hat Too Many, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 
1991, at 124. 
36. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, CORPORATE GoVERNANCE AND AMERICAN 
COMPETITIVENESS I 1-12 (1990). 
37. See THE WORKING GROUP ON CoRl'ORATE GoVERNANCE, A New Compact for 
Owners and Directors, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1991, at 532, 534. 
38. This phenomenon occurred at GM after the roles of CEO and chair were split. 
According to executive vice-president and director Hany Pearce, Paul O'Neil, a GM 
board member who is also CEO of Alcoa, "is absolutely uninhibited in challenging 
numbers and our analytical approach-that didn't happen in the past. The signals 
suggested that_it was unseemly behavior to ask questions or to delve into details." Judith 
H. Dobrzynski, Jack and John: 2 for the Road at G.M., N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1995, §3, 
·at 11. 
39. See LORSCH & MAcIVER, supra note 16. 
As part of its annual survey of directors, the executive search finn Kom/Feny 
International asked directors to answer the following question: "[l]n what way would the 
authority of the CEO be limited as a result of separating the two functions [CEO and 
chair] or in what way has it been limited if already separated?" KORN/FERRY 
INTERNATIONAL, 22ND ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STIJDY 26 (1995). The majority 
of directors indicated that the separation of the CEO and chair roles would result 1n the 
CEO exercising less control over board meetings, agendas, committee assignments, and 
the selection of new directors. Id. Moreover, the majority of outside directors indicated 
that the separation of the roles would reduce the CEO's feeling of"owning the board." 
Id. 
40. According to a 1992 survey conducted by Kom/Feny Intemational, 41% of 
CEOs believe that separating the roles of CEO and chair would impede management 
effectiveness. Joann S. Lublin, ManagemenJ.• Shareholders Campaign to Diffuse Power 
of Chief Executives by Splitting Top Jobs, WALL ST. J., Apr. l, 1992, at Bl, Moreover, 
only 25% of the 653 CEOs surveyed by the National Association of Corporate 
Executives favored a required separation of the CEO and chair roles. Id. See also 
Dobrzynski, supra note 38, at 11 ("I.B.M. 's Louis V. Gerstner Jr. and Allied Signal's 
Lawrence A. Bossidy are among many who have insisted on having both the chairman 
and C.E.O. titles before talcing top jobs,"), 
41. James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Leadership StroclUre: On the Separation 
of the Positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board, Working Paper FR 96-04, William 
E. Simon Graduate School of Business. University of Rochester (1995) (on file with the 
authors). 
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CEO and chair.42 In most of the companies in the United States that 
split the roles, the person serving as chair is a former CE0.43 Even if 
a company decides that having a separate independent chair is not in its 
best interests, a company can realize many of the advantages of 
separating the aforementioned two positions, if its independent directors 
appoint an independent senior member to serve as lead director. 
The lead director should be independent of management, which means 
that he or she should not be the retired CEO, who often has hand-picked 
the present CE0.44 The lead director should also not be affiliated with 
any firm (such as a customer, supplier, bank, law firm, or consulting 
firm) that does any material amount of business with the company. To 
avoid entrenchment and undue affiliation with management, it would be 
appropriate to impose a limit on the number of consecutive years a 
person can serve as lead director; a five-year limit would be reasonable. 
A company's lead director would function as the leader of the 
independent directors. In this capacity, the lead director would be able 
to take an active role in a number of areas of vital importance to the 
company. For example, Lipton and Lorsch have proposed that the lead 
director should be actively involved in the following matters: selecting 
board committee members and chairs; setting board meeting agendas; 
ensuring the adequacy of information that directors receive; and 
enhancing the effectiveness of the board meeting process.45 
The lead director would have the power to convene special and regular 
meetings of the independent directors, without management present, and 
would chair such meetings. By having the independent directors meet 
on a regular basis, the lead director can demonstrate to the CEO that 
having the independent directors meet in a session without management 
is not necessarily a sinister event indicating that the independent 
directors are displeased with management and are contemplating firing 
42. In a 1996 swvey of over 1,000 directors, only 19% of the respondents 
indicated their companies had a non-executive chair. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, 
23RD ANNuAL BOARD OF DIREcroRS SnmY 23 (1996). In addition, three percent of 
the directors surveyed indicated their boards were considering splitting the functions of 
CEO and chair. Id. Of the directors who served on the boards of companies that had 
a single individual as CEO and chair, only 27% indicated their boards had a lead 
director. Id, 
43. KoRNIFERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 39, at 20. 
44. The comments within this paragraph are also applicable to companies that have 
a non-executive chair. 
45. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 6, at 70. 
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the CEO. A separation of the :functions would also increase the 
likelihood that the board would consider alternative viewpoints and 
courses of action besides those supported by the CEO and chair. 
In addition to increasing the efficacy of routine activities engaged in 
by a board of directors, a lead director would also be an invaluable asset 
to a company's other directors in a time of crisis. For example, in the 
event of the sudden death or incapacity of a company's CEO, a lead 
director who is a recognized leader on the board of directors could step 
in and serve as a liaison between the board and the remaining members 
of management.46 By conducting regular meetings of independent 
directors, the lead director also strengthens the relationship among the 
independent directors and enables them to function more effectively in 
a time of crisis. 
In many boardrooms today, there is already an independent director 
who is recognized by the management and the independent directors as 
a leader.47 Some have argued that selecting an independent director as 
the leader of the independent directors will "simply legitimate this 
role.'..is Publicly identifying a person as the leader of the independent 
directors may also further the goal of providing greater accountability for 
the company's performance. The Wall Street Journal already regularly 
includes a box naming all of the directors in its articles on corporate 
disasters.49 Without a publicly identified leader, it is difficult for the 
shareholders and the public to hold any particular independent director 
accountable. On the other hand, if the leader of the independent 
directors is publicly identified, it is more likely that the leader will be 
singled out for criticism.so Fear of this criticism and the resultant loss 
of reputation can be a powerful incentive for conscientious board 
service.s1 As such, publicly designating a lead director provides a 
46. Jay W. Lorsch & Martin Lipton, On The Leading Edge: The Lead Director, 
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 79. 
47. See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 6, at 71. 
48. Id. 
49. See, e.g., Scott Kilman et al., An Executive Becomes Informant for the FBI. 
Stunning Giant ADM, WALL ST. J,, July 10, 1995, at Al, A6; Joan E. Rigdon, William 
Agee Will Leave Morrison Knudsen, WALL ST. J., Feb, 2, 1995, at Bl, B10. 
50. See Lowenstein, supra note 1, at Cl ("If you want to motivate [outside 
directors], make them responsible, i.e. guarantee that besmirchment will be the reward 
for being asleep at the switch."). 
51. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, ANO 
MANAGEMENT 258 {1992) ("[A}n agent whose business opportunities lie with a small 
group of principals who communicate among themselves must wony that actions that 
damage his or her reputation will result in the loss of a large volume of possible 
business."). See also Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected Social Context 
of Judgment and Choice, in 7 REs. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 297, 308 (LL. 
Cummings & Bany M. Staw eds., 1985) (According to H.L. Zetterberg, "[t]he 
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counter-weight to the often prevailing board culture and norms whereby 
directors avoid confrontation and only give advice when and if asked by 
the CEO. considering it "bad form" to push uninvited company 
business.52 
We acknowledge that serving as an independent chair or lead director 
is a big job. To provide a positive incentive to undertake such a role, 
the company should be prepared to provide the independent chair or lead 
director extra compensation commensurate with the time, effort, and 
responsibility involved.53 This will, for many companies, be an added 
cost of separating the roles or appointing a lead director.54 
ill. THE EFFECT OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND BOARD 
LEADERSHIP STRUCTIJRE ON CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
This part will discuss a recent study, the findings of which suggest 
that American corporations need to do more than just place independent 
directors on their boards to increase shareholder wealth via their 
corporate governance activities. This part will then analyze the recent 
research on the relationship between corporate performance and board 
leadership structure in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
A. The Bhagat & Black Study on Independent Directors 
Over the past twenty years, the boards of U.S. public companies have 
undergone a dramatic change in composition.55 Twenty years ago. 
inside directors, i.e. persons who were company officers or relatives of 
maximization of favorable attitudes from others [isJ the counterpart in sociological theory 
to the maximization of profit in economic theocy.''). 
52. William T. Allen, Corporate Directors in the Dawning Age of Post-Material-
ism: New Problems and New Solutions, Address at the Stanford University Center for 
Economic Policy Research Conference on Corporate Governance (May I, 1992). 
53. General Motors, for example. paid independent chair John Smale $300,000 in 
1993. 
54. For a further discussion of costs involved in splitting the roles of CEO and 
chair, see Brickley, et al., supra note 41, at 7-11. 
55. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 81 I, 840-41 (1992) (''Twenty years ago, many public 
company boards were controlled by insiders; today, almost all have a majority of outside 
directors, and many have a majority of independent directors ... .''). 
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officers,56 controlled many U.S. public companies' boards; today, 
however, independent directors, i.e. persons who have no compan17 
related business dealings and are not former company officers, 7 
comprise the majority of directors of many U.S. public companies.58 
The increasing number of independent directors on U.S. companies' 
boards can be seen as a response to the widely accepted belief that 
increasing the representation of independent directors on a company's 
board will improve its performance.59 As the performance of U.S. 
companies lagged behind that of their foreign competitors in the 1980s, 
many commentators argued that to compete successfully with their 
foreign competitors, U.S. companies needed to change their corporate 
governance practices.60 A central tenet of many corporate governance 
reform proposals espoused in the 1980s was that U.S. companies needed 
to place more independent directors on their boards to improve their 
performance.61 A recently conducted unpublished study by Professor 
Sanjai Bhagat of the University of Colorado Graduate School of 
Business and Professor Bernard Black of Columbia. Law School suggests 
that U.S. companies must do more than just place independent directors 
on their boards to increase shareholder wealth via their corporate 
governance activities.62 
The study represented the first large-scale, long~time-horizon analysis 
of the effect of independent directors on corporate performance,63 
Bhagat and Black analyzed the stock price and accounting performance 
of 950 large U.S. companies between 1983 and 1993.64 The authors 
selected the 950 companies from the Institutional Shareholder Services 
database, which is comparable to the Fortune 500 database but more 
inclusive in that it includes companies outside of the areas of manufac-
turing and mining.65 
The study found that the proportion of independent directors on a 
company's board "has no consistent effect on market~adjusted stock 
56. THE IS$ PROXY VOTING MANuAL 96-100 (R. Monks et al. eds., Institutional 
Shareholder Servs., 2d ed. 1991). 
57. Id. 
58. Black, supra note 55, at 841. 
59. Id. 
60. Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: Wlzen Do 
Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. LQ. 327,328 (1996). 
61. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GoVER-
NANCE (1994). 
62. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, Do Independent Directors Matter? (Working 
Paper, 1996) (on file with the authors). 
63. Id. at 2. 
64. Id. at 3. 
65. Id. 
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price performance."66 Moreover, the study found no evidence that the 
proportion of independent directors on a company's board positivez-
affects its performance across a wide range of accountings measures. 7 
The study's :findings suggest that independent directors, on average and 
over time, do not add any more value to the boards on which they serve 
than that which is added by non-independent directors. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that independent directors are capable of 
adding value only if they serve on boards with the appropriate board 
leadership structure. As a result, this study can be seen as suggesting 
that American companies need to focus on board leadership structure if 
they are to increase shareholder wealth through changes in their 
corporate governance. 
B. Recent Research on Board Leadership Structure 
in the United States 
The relationship between U.S. companies separating their chair and 
CEO positions and their performance has been the subject of only three 
recently published studies. This section will provide an overview of 
these three studies. We will also summarize the results of one unpub-
lished study. 
A 1991 study analyzed the performance of 250 randomly selected 
Fortune 500 companies between 1978 and 1983.68 The study's 
objective was to compare the multi-year financial performance of 
companies that had one individual serve as their chair and CEO and 
those that separated their chair and CEO positions.69 The study 
removed companies that changed their structure during the study. As a 
result, the study's sample consisted of 141 companies, thirty of which 
had separated their chair and CEO positions during the period from 1978 
to 1983.70 The study found that during each of the years between 1978 
and 1983, the companies that separated their chair and CEO positions 
had significantly higher average returns on investment, average returns 
on equity, and average profit margins than their counterparts that 
66. Id. 
67. Bhagat & Black, supra note 62, at 3. 
68. Paula L. Rechner & Dan R. Dalton, CEO Duality and Organizational 
Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 155 (1991). 
69. Id. at 156. 
70. Id. 
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combined their chair and CEO positions.71 These findings resulted in 
the study concluding that companies with separate chair and CEO 
positions "consistently outperformed" companies with a single individual 
serving as chair and CE0.72 
A 1993 study analyzed the effect of board leadership structure within 
the banking industry.73 This study analyzed the performance between 
1988 and 1990 of a yearly average of 112 banks, nineteen of which on 
average had a non-chair CEO.74 The study found that cost efficiency 
and return on assets are lower for banks where an individual serves as 
chair and CEO than banks that separate the chair and CEO positions.75 
The study concluded that «on average banks where the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board u.ndeierform those banks where the CEO is not 
the chairman of the board."7 
A 1996 study examined the relationship between corporate perfor-
mance and board leadership structure.77 This study analyzed each of 
the Fortune 500 companies as defined at the end of 1990 and then 
classified them based on their chair and CEO status for each year 
between 1986 and 1991.78 Companies that did not use standard 
managerial titles were removed from the study. As a result, on average, 
375 companies were studied for each year.79 Of the companies studied 
only twelve had total "nonduality," i.e., they had a separate chair and 
CEO for each year.80 This study found that the stock market is 
unaffected by a company's announcement indicating that it will allow 
one individual to serve as chair and CEO or separate its chair and CEO 
positions.81 Moreover, this study also found that "there is no difference 
in performance between firms with total nonduality during the period 
and firms with total "duality" [i.e., firms that bad a CEO/chair for each 
] '"' year .... 
71. Id. at 158•59. 
72. Id. at 155. 
73. Lynn Pi & Stephen G. Timme, Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency, 11 J. 
OF BANKmG AND FlN. 515 (1993). 
74. Id. at 522. 
15. id. at 529. 
76. Id. 
77. B. Ram Baliga et al., CEO Duality and Firm Pe,formance: What's the Fuss?, 
17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41 (1996). 
78. Id. at 44-45. 
19. Id. 
80. Id. 
31. Id. at 47. 
32. Baglia et al., supra note 77, at 49-50. 
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An unpublished 1995 study examined the relationship between board 
leadership structure and accounting performance.83 This study analyzed 
661 finns from the 1989 Forbes survey of executive compensation, and 
then classified them based on their chair and CEO status at the end of 
1988.84 Of the 661-company sample, 535 combined the roles of CEO 
and chair, ninety-three split the roles, and thirty-three had no chair.85 
This study compared accounting perfonnance for the two subsamples 
(the 535 companies that combined the roles and the ninety-three that 
split them) for 1988 and the period from 1989 to 1991. It found that 
median return on capital in 1988 was higher in firms that combined the 
roles than in those that split them.86 Over the period from 1989 to 
1991, each subgroup earned essentially the same return on capital.87 
Stock return for the two subgroups in 1988 was not significantly 
different under one statistical test but was under another.88 Over the 
period from 1989 to 1991, the median stoc~ return for firms combining 
the roles was substantially larger than the median stock return of firms 
that split the roles.89 When the study compared accqunting and market 
returns adjusted by industry medians, the differences in both periods 
across the two subgroups "generally [w~e] insignificant.',90 This study 
also found that "changes in leadership structure have no systematic 
effects on stock prices."91 
The authors of this study noted that "changes in leadership structure 
might convey information to the market about cash flows even if the 
structure itself does not affect performance,',92 and stated that "[t]he 
potential for these types of secondary information effects confounds the 
interpretation of our results."93 This caution appears well-placed given 
the authors' proposition, that in the United States, elevating the CEO to 
the combined roles of CEO and chair is usually ~ reward for good past 
83. Brickley et al., supra note 4 I. 
84. Id. at 13. 
85. Id. at 13-14. 
86. Id. at 26-27. 
87. Id. at 27. 
88. Brickley et al., supra note 41, at 27. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 36. 
92. Id. at 33. 
93. Brickley et al., supra note 41, at 34. 
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performance and a vote of confidence.94 If this is true, then we would 
expect the market to interpret an announcement that the roles are to be 
split as an indication that the CEO's performance has not been good, 
thereby signaling that future cash flows may be lower than the market 
had expected. 
The studies, taken together, suggest that at best separating the roles of 
chair and CEO positively impacts performance, and at worst it has no 
effect on performance. As a result, splitting the roles of chair and CEO 
might be compared to chicken soup: Can't hurt, might help.95 The 
lack of definitive empirical data means that we must rely on logic and 
reason together with anecdotal evidence to support our proposal. The 
logic has been presented in Part II and can be summarized as follows: 
The function of the chairman is to run board meetings and oversee the process 
of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO • • • • Without the 
direction of an independent leader, it is much more difficult for the board to 
perfonn its critical function. Therefore, for the board to be effective, it is 
important to separate the CEO and chairman positions.95 
The anecdotal evidence is presented in Part N. 
C. Recent Research on Board Leadership Structure 
in the United Kingdom 
The relationship between U.K. companies separating their chair and 
CEO positions and their performance has been the subject of one 
recently published study.97 This section will provide an overview of 
this study. 
This shldy analyzed 124 U.K. companies that announced a change in 
their board leadership structure between January of 1989 and December 
of 1992.98 For a company to be included in the survey, it had to 
announce that it intended to separate, maintain, or create the dual 
positions of CEO and chair, and the Financial Times had to mention this 
announcement.99 In addition, companies that had a confounding event, 
such as the declaration of a dividend within three days of a board 
94. Id. at 25. 
95. For an analysis of this type of argument in a different context, see Grundfest, 
supra note 3, at 868. 
96. Michael C. Jensen, Presidential Address: The Modem Industrial Revolution, 
Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. OF FIN. 831, 866 (1993). 
97. J. Dabya et al., The Case for Separating the Roles of Chairman and CEO: An 
Analysis of Stock Market and Accounting Data, 4 CORP. GoVERNANCE 71 (1996). 
98. Id. at 73. 
99. Id. 
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leadership announcement. were excluded from the study.100 As a 
result, the study only analyzed the effect of seventy-six companies• 
announcements. 101 
The study found that "a significant positive market reaction ... 
followed the separation of the responsibilities of chairman and 
CEO."102 The study also found that companies that announced they 
would separate the chair and CEO positions subsequently performed 
better than their counterparts based on accounting measures. 103 
Moreover, the study found that an announcement that a company would 
be combining its chair and CEO positions resulted in ''the largest 
negative market response the day after the announcement."104 
Although this study involved an analysis of a relatively small sample 
ofU.K. companies, its :findings support the contention that the separation 
of the chair and CEO positions can result in the creation of increased 
shareholder value. 105 Furthermore, the study's findings support the 
contention that separating the chair and CEO positions can lead to 
improved performance.106 
IV. EXAMPLES OF TIIB EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GoVERNANCE 
PRACTICES ON SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
To illustrate the possible negative consequences of inadequate 
corporate governance practices on shareholder value, this part examines 
the stock price effects of several recent, well-publicized examples of 
management underperformance that have occurred arguably as a direct 
result of inadequate corporate governance. These examples are intended 
to illustrate the adverse effects that can occur when a company's 
management pays inadequate attention to corporate governance issues. 
This part concludes with a discussion of the recent events at General 
Motors and Compaq, illustrating the positive effects that can occur when 
a company's management pays attention to corporate governance issues. 
JOO. Id. 
l01. Id. 






In presenting these examples we do not mean to suggest that all of the 
problems could have been solved by inserting an independent chair or 
lead director. Rather, we maintain that having an independent chair or 
lead director will, over time, contribute to the creation of a culture in 
which non-management directors act in an independent manner and 
:fulfill their responsibilities. Such a culture is most likely to result when 
the separation of the CEO and chair or designation of a lead director is 
coupled with other generally accepted features of good corporate 
governance, such as having a predominately outside board, establishing 
an independent nominating committee that makes nominations based on 
an articulated statement of director qualifications and does periodic 
reviews of individual directors' performance, and imposing a retirement 
age for directors and term limits on committee chairs. 107 
We also do not mean to suggest that all CEOs who are also chairs 
cannot be trusted and are not doing their jobs. For those who are, our 
proposal will only add to their credibility and effectiveness. enabling 
them to make better use of the board by increasing the likelihood that 
there will be an independent chair or lead director to turn to between 
meetings, who also will lead the independent directors in a candid 
evaluation of the CEO~s performance and encourage open, frank, and 
constructive discussion of corporate strategy. 
A. Archer-Daniels-Midland 
On June 27, 1995, the federal government issued subpoenas for a 
criminal investigation into possible price-fixing at Archer-Daniels-
Midland ("ADM") to a number of the company's senior officers.108 
Federal authorities played excerpts of taped conversations, which the 
authorities believed had captured ADM executives engaging in illegal 
price-fixing with several of ADM's competitors, to some of the senior 
officers who received subpoenas.10!> However, none of ADM's senior 
officers acknowledged any wrongdoing or agreed to cooperate in the 
Federal investigation. 110 Within days, ADM received yet another 
surprise: Mark E. Whiteacre, the head of its bioproducts division and 
a long-time employee of the company, had been working with prosecu-
tors and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for approximately three 
107. John A. Byrne & Richard A. Melcher, The Best & Worst Boards, Bus. WK., 
Nov. 25, 1996, at 82, 104, 
108. Kurt Eichenwald, A Shareholder Rebellion: Investors Demand Answers from 
Archer-Daniels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 19, 1995, at DI. 
109. Id. 
I IO. Id. 
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years. m Moreover, during these years, Whiteacre had tape-recorded 
thousands of conversations.112 
As news of the federal investigation became public, the company's 
stock declined.113 While the S&P 500 gained 0.42 percent on June 28, 
1995, ADM stock declined by approximately 3.33 percent and closed at 
$16.44.114 Moreover, in the three months following the accusations, 
while the S&P 500 gained 7 .55 percent, ADM stock declined by an 
additional 8.76 percent.115 This resulted in ADM's shareholder wealth 
decreasing by approximately $1.0 billion.116 These events prompted 
Bonnie Wittenburg, an analyst with the securities firm Dain Bosworth, 
to assert that «[e]ven in the best case scenario ... there [would] be a 
cloud over [ADM's] stock for the next c1;mple of years."117 
In the months after the public became aware of the federal investiga-
tion into ADM, the company~s practices became a subject of media 
attention and public scrutiny. The federal government's price-fixing 
probe focused on three particular ADM products: high fructose com 
syrup, a sweetener used in soft drinks; lysine, a food additive; and citric 
acid, a product used in everything from detergent to fruit juice. 118 
Although ADM had become the subject of much attention, in the months 
following the public disclosure of the antitrust probe, the company's 
management "labored mightily to keep analysts and reporters at 
bay. ,,119 
In the following months, ADM became the subject of yet another 
alleged scandal. Allegations that ADM made off-the-books payments. 
which its senior management approved, began to circulate.120 These 
allegations began when ADM fired Whiteacre in August of 1995 for 
allegedly embezzling $2.5 million, a figure that the company subsequent-
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Ronald Henkoff & Richard Behar, Andreas S Mole Problem is Becoming a 
Mountain, FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 1995, at 58. 
114. Search of DATASTREAM, Equities Library, Time Series File. 
II5. Id. 
tl6. William Patterson & Bartlett Naylor, Sour Dramas of Poor Corporate 
Governance, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Nov. 27, 1995, at 10. 
ll7. Henkoff & Behar, supra note 113, at 59. 
1 18. Patricia Commins, Large Shareholders UJntinue to Press for Changes in ADM 
Board, 1lm REUTER EUROPEAN BUS. REP., Oct 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, REUEUB File. 
J 19. Henkoff & Behar, supra note 113, at 58. 
120. Ronald Henkoff, Checks, Lies, and Videotape, FORTUNE, Oct 30, 1995, at 109. 
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ly raised to $9.0 million. 121 In his defense, Whiteacre alleged that his 
supervisors approved the disputed payments and that he did not engage 
in embezzling.122 
Following the aforementioned events, AD M's management became the 
subject of much criticism, which focused on ADM's corporate gover-
nance practices. A single individual, Dwayne O. Andreas, age seventy-
seven, had served as ADM's chair and CEO since 1972P3 Moreover, 
Andreas used his position as chair and CEO to help place directors on 
ADM's board who bad close ties to him.124 ADM's seventeen mem-
ber board included twelve directors with direct ties to management. 125 
These twelve directors consisted of both current and former ADM 
executives, two descendants of ADM founders, a relative of an ADM 
executive other than Andreas, and one of ADM's outside lawyers.126 
Institutional investors and members of the media criticized ADM's 
board of directors for its lack of independence. For example, Jon 
Lukumnik, deputy controller for pensions for the New York City 
Retirement Systems ("NYCRS"), described AD M's board as "remarkable 
for its interconnections, friendships and blood ties with the chief 
executive officer."127 ADM's directors included Dwayne Andreas; his 
son, Michael Andreas, vice chair; James Randall, president; John 
Daniels, retired chair of the board; Ralph Bruce, retired executive vice 
president; and Lowell Andreas, retired president.128 The lack of 
independent directors on ADM's board prompted some critics of its 
corporate governance practices to suggest that the acronym ADM 
referred to "All Dwayne's Men:~129 
In response to the situation~ institutional investors, who owned 
approximately forty-eight percent of ADM's stock, placed an unprece-
dented amount of pressure on ADM. 130 Over thirty institutional 
shareholders, including CalPERS~ withheld their votes with respect to the 




124. Paul Menion, Cozy Board Ties H(IVe ADM in Bind: Critics Charge 
Connections Hurt Credibility, CRAIN'S Cm. Bus., Aug. 7, 1995, at 3. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Commins, supra note 118. 
128. Id. 
129. David Snyder, Investor Assault on ADM: They Should Know Better, CRAIN'S 
Cm. Bus., Nov. 6, 1995, at 13. 
130. Id. 
131. Shaton Walsh, ADM Chief Thwarts Hostile Sharel10/ders: Board Reelected by 
More Than 80% Margin, WASH. POST, Oct 20, 1995, at Bl. 
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investors' efforts resulted in the withholding of over twenty percent of 
the votes, they did not affect the election's outcome.132 
ADM finally responded to these shareholders at its annual 
shareholders' meeting on October 19, 1995. The meeting started rather 
cantankerously. When a hostile shareholder representative tried to ask 
a question, Andreas resEonded by saying, "This meeting, sir, runs 
according to my rules."' 3 Later, when a representative of a pension 
fund, which held more than 1.0 million shares of ADM stock, tried to 
raise a question, Andreas told security personnel to turn off the 
microphone.134 
After Andreas and ADM President Randall spoke, Brian Mulroney, a 
former Canadian prime minister and an ADM board member, reported 
on the work of a special committee, which he chaired, that was 
overseeing the company's response to the antitrust investigation.135 
Moreover, Mulroney indicated that ADM would appoint a corporate 
governance committee, which would be co-chaired by Ray Goldberg, a 
professor of agribusiness at Harvard University, and Glenn Webb, chair 
of an ADM subsidiary. il6 Mulroney also indicated that the corporate 
governance committee would "review the company's corporate 
governance procedures."137 
On January 3, 1996, a group of sixteen public and union pension 
funds representing millions of shares of ADM stock wrote a letter to the 
company's corporate governance committee and recommended that the 
board be composed of a majority of independent directors and that 
certain committees be "comprised of solely independent directors."138 
In mid-January, ADM's corporate governance committee came out with 
its proposal recommending that ADM reduce its board size and reduce 
the number of inside directors. 139 As a result of the committee's work, 





136. Walsh, supra note 131. 
137. Id. 
138. Nancy Millman,ADM's "AIMn-the•Family' Board Faulted: Replacements May 
Be Recommended at Meeting, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1996, at Cl. 
139. Scott Kilman & Joann S. Lublin, ADM Panel Recommends Sweeping Changes 
in Board, WALL ST . .r., Jan. 16, 1996, at A3. See also Richard A. Melcher et al., ft Isn't 
Dwayne's World Anymore, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1996, at 82. 
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board and board committees at the next annual meeting.140 Although 
commentators lauded ADM for taking these steps to improve its 
corporate governance practices, many commentators also criticized ADM 
for failing to take all of the necessary steps, such as establishing "a 
strong •tead director' as a counterweight to Andreas .... "141 
On October 15, 1996, ADM plead guilty to two criminal charges of 
price-fixing and agreed to pay a $100 million dollar :fine,142 the largest 
criminal antitrust fine ever levied.143 In addition, ADM agreed to help 
the government build a criminal case against two executives, Michael 
Andreas and Terrance Wilson.144 At the annual shareholder meeting 
on October 17, 1996, eight board members removed themselves from the 
ADM board, and three more individuals joined ADM's board.145 As 
a result, AD M's board now consists of twelve members, three of whom 
are independent.146 
Although ADM has taken action to address the inadequacy of its 
corporate governance practices, the ex-post nature of these actions leaves 
one pondering how many of ADM's current problems could have been 
avoided if it had separated its chair and CEO positions or had appointed 
a lead director. Moreover, one wonders how much of ADM's sharehold-
er wealth would have been preserved if the company had acted 
proactively to ensure that its corporate governance practices provided it 
with the normal checks and balances of a corporation of its size and 
stature. 
B. Morrison Knudsen 
Unlike the board of ADM, the board of Morrison Knudsen ("l\1K."), 
an engineering, construction, mining, and rail concern renowned for its 
construction of the Hoover Dam and San Francisco Bay Bridge, 
appeared to consist of independent outsiders, such as Peter S. Lynch; 
former manager of the Fidelity Magellan Fund, and Peter V. Ueberoth, 
former commissioner of major league baseball, who should have been 
familiar with what shareholders expect from a public company.147 
140. Id. 
141. Richard A. Melcher & Greg Bums, Archer Daniels' Cleanup: Don't Stop Now, 
Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 1996, at 37. See also Byrne & Melcher, supra note 107, at 85 
(ADM cited as having the worst board in the United States). 
142. Melcher et al., supra note 139, at 82. 
143. Three Former ADM Executives Indicted, L.A. TIMES, Dec, 4, 1996, at D3. 
144. Mechler et al., supra note 139, at 82. 
145. Id. at 84. 
146. Id. 
147. Diana B. Henriques, Ties That Bind: His Directors, Her Charity,, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 21, 1995, at DI. 
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However, events that unfolded in 1994 revealed that, like the board of 
ADM, the board of MK may have benefited from the presence of a lead 
director or the separation of its chair and CEO positions. 
MK earned an annual profit of approximately $35.0 million in 1990, 
1991, and 1993 and lost approximately $7.1 million in 1992. MK. 
shocked investors when it unexpectedly lost in excess of $350.0 million 
in 1994.148 After MK. announced an unanticipated loss of approxi-
mately $40.5 million in the second quarter of 1994,149 its stock price 
plummeted by approxi:q.tately thirty percent.150 
Shortly after this unexpected announcement, MK shareholders :filed a 
class action suit against the company, its CEO and Chair William J. 
Agee, two other corporate officers, and its outside auditor Deloitte & 
Touche.151 The suit claimed that MK had made false and misleading 
statements and misled investors about the company's future pro:fitabili-
ty.152 Subsequently, shareholders filed thirteen additional ,shareholder 
derivative suits against Agee and various other board members. These 
suits repeated the claims alleged in the class action suit and also accused 
Agee of leading MK. to financial ruin via his executive decisions and of 
misappropriating corporate assets for his personal use.153 These suits 
also accused :MK's directors of abandoning their oversight responsibili-
ties.154 
In addition to significantly reducing MK's shareholders' wealth,155 
MK.'s unexpected loss in 1994 posed a significant threat to MK's future 
:financial viability. To fulfill its contractual obligations, MK. required 
additional sources of cash in 1995.156 However, because of MK.'s 
precarious financial condition and the possibility that it might "seek 
protection from its creditors · under the United States Bankruptcy 
" 
148. MORRISON KNuDsEN CORP., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (1995). 
149. Dan Popkey, SEC Lare UJ the Game, IDAHO STATESMAN, June 9, 1995, at SA. 
150. See infra Exhibit I, APPENDIX for an analysis of MK's stock performance 
relative to the S&P 500. 




155. MK stockholders owned equity worth approximately $407.0 million at the end 
of 1993. However, at the end of 1994, MK stockholders owned equity worth less than 
$57.7 million. MORRISON KNUDSEN CoRP., supra note 148, at 28. 
156. Id. at 20. 
173 
Code,"157 MK.'s ability to obtain additional :financing became uncer-
tain. 
As an engineering, construction, mining, and rail concern, MK 
competed with other firms for various long-term contracts. MK could 
assess the profitability of many of these contracts only after performing 
them. In 1994, MK.'s engineering and construction division lost in 
excess of $82.0 million, MK.'s rail subsidiary lost in excess of $31.0 
million, and MK.'s transit division lost in excess of $224.0 million. 158 
Critics focused on the process by which MK. selected what prices to bid 
for contracts because cost overruns on allegedly profitable contracts 
resulted in MK.'s enormous losses.159 Moreover, the managerial 
decisions of Agee, MK's chair and CEO, also became the subject of 
increasing attention. 160 
MK had submitted bids for many of these long-term contracts that 
were so low that MK. incurred substantial losses fulfilling its contractual 
obligations.161 MK. officially cited a decrease in new contract awards, 
postponements of start-ups of previously awarded contracts, write-downs 
of operating assets and investments, and provisions for anticipated losses 
on uncompleted contracts as several of the sources of its loss.162 
However, others blamed Agee and accused him of intentionall,t3 
underbidding certain contracts to ensure that IVIK received tbem. 1 1 
For example, Agee reportedly underbid several major transit-car 
contracts because he thought that doing so would enable MK to solidify 
its position in this line ofbusiness.164 MK.'s 1994 financial results and 
the transit division's 1994 loss of $224.7 million revealed that Agee's 
strategy had disastrous effects on the company and its shareholders. 165 
Critics of Agee focused not only on his managerial decisions but also 
on his personal conduct. Although Agee moved to Boise, Idaho. the 
location of:MK's headquarters, in 1988,166 he sold his Boise residence 
to :tv.1K and began running the corporation from his residence in Pebble 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 15-17. 
159. See, e.g., Allan Sloan, William Agee: His Record of Disastrous Management 
Remains Intact, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1995, at D2. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. MORRISON KNuDsEN CORP., supra note 148, at 15-16. 
163. Julie Bailey, MK Acts to Isolate Transit Business, IDAHO STATESMAN, June 28, 
1995, at 58. 
164. Id. 
165. See infra Exhibit I, APPENDIX. 
166. Martin Wolk,MorrisonKnudsen Ousts Agee as Chairman, REUTER Bus. REP., 
Feb. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS File. 
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Beach, California, in the spring of 1994.167 Moreover, in January of 
1994, the MK compensation committee agreed to increase Agee's salary 
by more than $150,000 after an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") audit 
of his taxes for 1990, 1991, and 1992. The m.s found that Agee should 
have reported income of $56,892 for his wife's use of the MK airplane, 
$99,383 for company-paid secwity systems at his houses, and $1,350 for 
using a company warehouse to store personal items.168 As a result of 
the absentee management, the IRS audit, and other activities, Agee 
developed a reputation as "an out-of-touch executive living a lavish 
lifestyle at the expense of the faltering company."169 An editorial in 
a leading Boise newspaper asked the following question: "Is MK an 
international construction firm or a posh playground for the rich and 
famous of Pebble Beach?"170 
Toe personal relationships between many ofMK's directors and Agee 
also became an issue during this time period. Nine of MK.'s eleven 
directors became directors after Agee had been appointed MK.'s CEO 
and chair in 1988.171 Moreover, Agee also served as a director of MK. 
Six of MK's directors had close ties to Agee via the Nurturing 
Network, a tiny private charity set u~ by his wife to provide young 
women with alternatives to abortion. In addition to Agee, Gerard 
Roche, an MK director, and the wives of five other outside directors had 
served on the charity's board. 173 On some occasions, the charity's 
board even met at the same time and location as MK.'s board. Further-
more, on some of these occasions, the boards shared intimate dinners 
that spotlighted the charity's work.174 
Although personal friendships and family socializing are routine 
among outside directors and CEOs, the nature of these fiiendships and 
the extent of the socializing present at :MK went beyond the norm. 
Lorsch stated that he was "quite surprised that there could be this kind 
167. Dan Popkey, Boardroom/or Buddies, IDAHO STATESMAN, June 9, 1995, at IA. 
168. Id. 
169. Wolle, supra note 166. 
170. MK Directors Accountable for Past Mistakes, Future Direction, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Feb. 12, 1995, at 14A. 
171. Greg Heberlein, Gee, Here ls at Least I Thank You/or Bill Agee, SEATILE 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at Fl. 
172. Henriques, supra note 147, at DI. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at D4. 
175 
of complicated arrangement going on that nobody knows about."175 
He further stated: "I have never seen a situation like this."176 
The conduct of :MK's directors also came under increasing scrutiny 
after the events of 1994.177 For example, Chief Executive cited MK.'s 
board as one of America's worst corporate boards.178 The magazine 
criticized :MK's board for failing to meet at :MK's corporate headquarters 
for over a year and for paying excessive attention to the CEO's 
compensation.179 The magazine also criticized MK.'s board for failing 
to take corrective actions as soon as they were necessary.1so 
In late 1994 and early 1995, two new outsiders, William P. Clark and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, joined MK.'s board.is, In February of 1995, with 
1vlK facing immense losses and with the board galvanized by the 
addition of two new directors, MK.'s board demanded and received 
Agee's resignation. 182 Subsequently, in September of 1995, IvIK 
settled all but one derivative suit against it.183 Although the settlement 
did not include any findings of wrongdoing by :MK or any of the 
individual defendants, the settlement provided for: (1) :MK's directors' 
and officers' liability insurance carriers to pay $35.0 million to plaintiffs, 
(2) MK to issue over 2.9 million shares of common stock to the plaintiff 
class, (3) Agee to relinquish certain contractual benefits, and (4) the 
implementation of certain corporate governance procedures, including 
reasonable efforts to appoint seven additional non-employee directors to 
1v1K.'s board.184 In addition to adding these non-employee directors; 
MK also announced that it would separate the positions of CEO and 
chair.185 
When MK announced that it would be merging with Washington 
Construction Group Inc. in May of 1996, the NYSE halted trading in 
1flC stock.186 On July 9, 1996, 1v1K. filed a pre-packaged Chapter 11 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. See, e.g., Robert W. Lear & Boris Yavitz, The Best and Worst Boards of 1995: 
Evaluating the Boardroom, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1995, at 24. 
178. Id. 
179. MK's 1993 proxy statement ran 43 pages, 38 of which concerned the 
compensation programs for Agee and other top officers. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Lear & Yavitz, supra note 177, at 24. 
183. Morrison Knudsen Settles Securities, Derivative Litigation, PR NEWSWIRE, 
Sept 20, 1995. 
184. Id. 
185. Katy Robinson, Agee Fiasco Provides Lessons for Other Businesses, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Feb. 9, 1996, at 2A. 
186. Ellie Rodgers, MK's Directors Open New Era Today, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 
12, 1996, at SB. 
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bankruptcy plan.187 Under the term of the agreement, :tvIK.'s sharehold-
ers received one warrant for every thirteen and three-tenths shares of 
:tvIK. stock they owned. 188 Each warrant gave its holder the right to 
purchase one share of the combined company's stock for $12 over a 
period of six and one-half years. 189 The combined company assumed 
the Morrison Knudsen name.190 On September 12, 1996, shares of the 
new Morrison Knudsen began trading on the New York Stock Ex-
change.191 They closed at $9.63 after their :first day oftrading.192 
Although MX's board ultimately took steps to address the problems 
associated with its CEO and chair, and agreed to take steps that will 
ultimately result in increasing the efficacy of its corporate governance 
practices, it did so only after MK shareholders lost a significant amount 
of their wealth. Between year end 1993 and year end 1994, :MK 
shareholders lost approximately $350.0 million. 193 A shareholder who 
purchased MX stock on the last trading day of 1993 and sold this stock 
on the last trading day of 1994 would have lost almost 85.0% of her or 
his investment. 194 
The events that transpired in 1994 leave one wondering whether they 
would have occurred if :MK had separated the roles of CEO and chair or 
appointed a lead director at an early stage. The presence of a strong and 
independent leader on the board would have certainly diminished Agee's 
control over the board and may have resulted in a course of events that 
would not have been so disastrous for :MK and its shareholders. 
187. Morrison Knudsen Fifes for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, REurER. Bus. REP., June 
25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File, 
188. Ellie Rodgers, MK Bankruptcy Plan Baffles Investors, IDAHO STA1ESMAN, 
Sept 23, 1996, at 5B. 
189. Id. 
190. Rodgers, supra note 186, at SB. 
191. Id. 
192. Search of DATASTREAM, Equities Libnuy, Time Series File. 
193. MORRISON KNUDSEN CORP., supra note 148, at 28. 
194. Id. 
177 
C. General Motors 195 
In 1981, General Motors ("GM"), the largest American automobile 
manufacturer, appointed a new chair and CEO, Roger Smith.1% Smith 
had spent his entire career at GM, having started work as a general 
accounting clerk. m Soon after the board appointed him chair and 
CEO, Smith began his attempt to transform GM into an automobile 
industry leader through the increased use of new processes and 
technology. 198 For example, between 1981 and 1985, GM spent over 
$40 billion on high-technology plants equipped with the latest lasers, 
computers, and robots-an amount of money that exceeded the market 
valuations of Toyota and Nissan.199 
Despite these efforts to make GM increasingly competitive via 
technology, the company remained noncompetitive.200 GM critics 
characterized the company's new products as "unexciting, look-alike car 
models."201 The "unexciting" nature of GM's new car models partially 
explains why GM lost market share throughout the 1980s.202 "During 
the 1980s, GM's share of North American car sales shrank to about 
[thirty-five percent] from [forty-Ilve percent] as car buyers switched to 
smaller, more :fuel~efficient Japanese cars."203 In addition to losing 
market share, GM became an inefficient and high-cost producer.204 
While GM improved its assembly efficiency by approximately five 
percent in the 1980s, its two main American competitors, Ford and 
Chrysler, improved their assembly efficiencies by seventeen percent and 
thirty-one percent, respectively, during this same period.205 As a 
result, while the S&P 500 increased by approximately 227 percent 
195. For a more detailed analysis of General Motors, see ROBERT A.G. MONKS & 
NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 327-71 (1995), 
196. Stan Hinden, Corporate Raiders and Company Men, WASH. POST, May 28, 
1989, at XI 1. 
197. Id. 
198. Adam Wong, De-Robotising the Car Industry, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 9, 
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. 
199. Id. 
200. See, e.g., S.C. Gwynne, Big Plans for Small Car; New Boss Bob Stempel Aims 
to Make GM's Latest Model a Hit, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 53. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Daly & Cazzin, supra note 13, at 90. 
204. MONKS & M!NOW, supra note 195, at 361. 
205. Id. 
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between 1980 and 1990, GM stock afil'reciated by only approximately 
sixty-nine percent durin~ the decade.2 
During the 1980s, GM's board had developed a reputation for being 
dominated by Smitb.207 Fortune made the following observations 
about Smith's interactions with the GM board; 
Roger Smith kept the board on a very short leash. He withheld key financial 
data and budget allocation proposals until the day before meetings and 
sometimes distributed them minutes before the participants convened. The 
monthly sessions were rigidly structured and Smith adjourned them promptly 
at five minutes to noon, leaving little rooin for discussion. Circumstances and 
personality enabled Roger Smith to exercise his iron control. Quick to anger, 
he was intolerant of criticism. Few board members had the ability or desire to 
take him on. 208 
By engaging in the aforementioned activities, Smith precluded GM's 
board from assessing the soundness of his executive decisions. 
As Smith approached retirement, the subject of who would succeed 
him as GM's chair and CEO became a source of friction between GM's 
management and GM's institutional shareholders.209 Traditionally, 
GM's chair and CEO chose his successor long before he retired and the 
former CEO retained a position on the board.210 However, two of 
GM's largest shareholders. CalPERS and the New York State Retirement 
System ("NYSRS"), wrote letters to GM's board indicating their concern 
that GM's succession process was a source of its current problems.211 
However, GM's directors never responded directly to the concerns of 
CalPERS or NYSRS and allowed Smith basically to choose his 
successor.212 
In August of 1990, GM's directors elected a new CEO and Chair, 
Robert Stempel.213 Stempel, who had spent his entire career at GM as 
an engineer, was the first CEO of GM in over thirty years whose 
206. James B. Treece, Can GM's Big Investors Get It to Change Lanes?, Bus. WK., 
Jan. 22, 1990, at 30, See infra Exhibit II, APPENDIX for a comparison of the 
performance of GM versus Ford and Chrysler. 
207. See, e.g., Alex Taylor III, What's Ahead for GM's New Team, FORTUNE, Nov. 
30, 1992, at 59. 
208. Id. 
209. MONKS & MrNow, supra note 195, at 362. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Taylor, supra note 207, at 58. 
213. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1991). 
179 
principal area of expertise involved something other than finance.214 
Although Stempel replaced Smith as GM's CEO and chair, Smith 
remained a GM director.215 
After Stempel replaced Smith, the U.S. economy began to stag-
nate.116 Because the auto industry is a cyclical industry (i.e., an 
industry in which profits rise and fall with the economy), and because 
GM is a major participant in the auto industry, the economic downturn 
caused GM, in Stempel's own words, to enter into a "kamikaze 
dive."117 Although GM had never suffered consecutive annual losses 
in its history prior to 1990, GM suffered three consecutive annual losses 
between 1990 and 1992. GM lost approximately $2.0 billion in 1990, 
$4.4 billion in 1991, and $23.5 billion in 1992.'" 
GM's North American operations accounted for a substantial portion 
of GM's unprecedented losses.219 For example, in 1991, GM's North 
American operations lost in excess of$7 .0 billion, which translates 0 into 
a loss of $1.0 million every hour, every day of the year."220 In the 
early l 990s, GM's North American operations significantly lagged 
behind those of their competitors in term of cost effectiveness.221 
Experts attributed some of the blame for this situation to Smith's 
investment in tecbnology.222 These individuals characterized GM1s 
investment in technology during the Smith era as unjustifiable and 
unwise.223 
Stempel unsuccessfully attempted to restore GM to profitability.224 
During the early 1990s, GM launched a major workforce reduction 
campaign in which it closed numerous plants and terminated thousands 
of employees.225 However, these changes did not return GM to 
pro:fitability.226 GM also took the following steps in the early 1990s: 
(I) it issued approximately $2.4 billion in new equity, (2) it increased its 
debt by approximately $2.4 billion, (3) it reduced its annual stock 
214. MONKS & ~ow, supra note 195, at 362. 
215. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 213, at 52. 
216. Joseph B. White & Paul Ingrassia, Eminence GriSe, Behind Revolt al GM. 
L~er Ira Millstein Helped Call the Shots, WAu., ST. J., Apr. 13, 1992, at Al, AJ3, 
217. Id. at AB. 
218. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 54 (1994), 
219. Warren Brown, GM Directors Pick Smale as Chairman, WASH. POST, Nov. 
2, 1992. at Al. 
220. Id. 
221. Daly & Cazzin, supra note 13, at 94 ("Smith also saddled his successor with 
the highest production and labor costs in the auto industry., .. "). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 218, at 54. 
225. Taylor, supra note 207, at 60-61. 
226. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 218, at 54. 
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dividend from $3.00 to $1.60, (4) it cut its capital spending, and (5) it 
made questionable assumptions about the rate of return on its pension 
fund that resulted in the fund being underfunded by approximately $17 .0 
billion.221 
These actions and GM's continued losses prompted institutional 
investors, such as CalPERS, to increase pressure on GM's board, which 
began to take on an increasingly active role in management.228 For 
example, a group of GM's outside directors began to meet secretly on 
the night prior to board meetings to discuss the ongoing changes at 
GM.229 On April 6, 1992, GM's board indicated its displeasure with 
GM's existing management by replacing GM's president Lloyd Reuss, 
the head of GM's unprofitable North American operations, with Jobn F. 
("Jack") Smith, Jr., the head of GM's profitable international operations, 
and by demoting Stempel from his post as chair of the executive 
com.mittee.230 Moreover, the board announced that John Smale, a GM 
board member and the former chair and CEO of Procter & Gamble Co., 
would assume Stempel's position as chair of the executive committee, 
and that Stempel would be required to report to Smale.231 
The stock market reacted positively to the board's April 6 announce-
ment.232 After the announcement, GM's stock price increased by 3.4 
percent.23:, This increase resulted in GM's shareholder wealth increas-
ing by approximately $1.4 billion.2:w 
After the April 6 announcement, Stempel continued his gradual 
attempts to streamline and reform GM.235 However, newspaper articles 
bad begun appearing in mid-October, first in The Washington Post and 
then in other national dailies, indicating that GM's directors planned to 
remove Stempel.236 On October 26, Stempel resigned.237 
227. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 195, at 365. 
228. See, e.g., Kathleen Kerwin et al., Crisis at GM, Bus. WK., Nov. 9, 1992, at 
86. 
229. Id. 
230. Taylor, supra note 207, at 60. 
231. Id. 








The stock market reacted positively to the rumors that GM's board 
would remove Stempel.238 On October 21 and 22, while the S&P 
declined from 415.480 to 414.900, GM stock increased from $29.75 to 
$32.88, based on the rumors that GM's board would fire Stempel.239 
This increase in GM's stock price resulted in its shareholder wealth 
increasing by an amount in excess of $2.0 billion.240 Moreover, on the 
day of Stempel's resignation, while the S&P increased from 414.100 to 
418.160 (0.98 percent), GM's shares increased from $33.50 to $34.15 
(1.87 percent).241 This increase resulted in GM's shareholder wealth 
increasing by about $300.0 million.242 
On November 1, 1992,243 GM's board of directors replaced Stempel 
with Jack Smith, who had been GM's president since April, and Smale, 
who had been chair of GM's executive committee since April.244 
GM's board appointed Smith to serve as GM's CEO and Smale to serve 
as GM's chair. Smale would be GM's first non-management chair in 
approximately fifty years.245 
After GM's board appointed Smale chair, he began working with other 
board members to improve GM's corporate governance practices to 
ensure that in the future GM's board would respond quickly to 
mismanagement.246 GM's 1992 annual report included the following 
message from Smale: "During the past year, the General Motors board 
has reexamined its processes and bas established a set of operating 
guidelines which will ensure that it is performing its responsibilities with 
the same discipline and dedication that it expects from manage-
mcnt."241 
In 1994, after working on the project for over a year, GM's board 
publicly announced a twenty-eight-point set of guidelines on significant 
corporate governance issues facing the company.248 The guide-
lines249 generated considerable positive publicity for GM.250 
238. See Grundfest, supra note 3, at 895-96. 
239. Search of DATASTREAM, Equities Library, Time Series File. 
240. See Grundfest, supra note 3, at 895-96. 
241. Search of DATASTREAM, Equities Library, Time Series File. 
242. See Grundfest, supra note 3, at 895-96. 
243. Brown, supra note 219, at Al. 
244. An analystS of the effect of this announcement on GM's market capitalization 
would be difficult to perfonn because GM's board also made several other important 
announcements on this day. For example, the board indicated that GM's dividend would 
be reduced by 50%. 
245. Brown, supra note 219, at Al. 
246, GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 218, at 3. 
247. Id. 
248. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 10. 
249. Keith Naughton,New Guidelines Prove GM's Directors Have Taken the Wheel, 
DET. NEWS, March 25, 1994, at Al. 
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Although GM's guidelines do not exgress a preference as to whether 
the CEO and chair should be separate, 51 they specifically provide that 
if GM's board appoints a GM employee chair, then GM's outside 
directors will select a lead director who "will assume the responsibility 
of chairing the regularly scheduled meetings of outside [d]irectors or 
other responsibilities which the outside [ d]irectors as a whole might 
designate from time to time." 252 
In late 1995, Smale decided to retire as GM's chair.253 During his 
tenure as chair, Smale had worked closely with Smith and helped 
transform GM into a company that earned a profit in excess of $5.0 
billion in the first nine months of 1995 from a company that lost in 
excess of $23.0 billion in 1992.254 On December 4, 1995, GM's board 
appointed Smith chair and once again allowed one person to serve as the 
company's CEO and chair.255 However, in a move designed in part 
to reassure major shareholders that GM would not return to its past 
corporate governance ~ractices, GM's board named Smale the 
company's lead director. 56 The following statements made by Smith 
indicated that, as GM's lead director, Smale would remain active in 
overseeing the company's management: 
The changes announced today will pennit [Smale] to continue the leadership 
role he bas played on the GM board, while pennitting bim to reduce his day-to-
day involvement in GM's governance. The fundamental role ofGM's directors 
in overseeing GM's management and affairs will continue.2..'17 
250. Martin Dickson, Policy Codifies Power for Non-Executives-Martin Dickson 
Considers General Motors' New Guidelines on the Role of Its Board of Directors, FIN. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1994, at 16 ("It has been variously hailed as a 'Magna Carta for U.S. 
directors,' 'a very important corporate governance document,' and a 'very commendable 
example."'). 
251. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., supra note 10. 
252. Id. 
253. Bradley A. Stertz & Daniel Howes, GM Names Smith as Chairman: Smale, 68, 




257. id. See also Judith H. Dobrzynski, As He Steps Down, G.M Chairman Looks 
Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1995, at D4. 
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C. Compaq Computer 
Unlike ADM, MK, or GM, Compaq Computer ("Compaq"), a 
designer, manufacturer, and marketer of computers for business and 
professional users, has had a separate chair and CEO since the 
company's inception.258 Since 1983, the year in which Compaq began 
selling computers, Benjamin M. Rosen, the chair of the venture capital 
firm that provided Campa~ with much of its initial funding, has served 
as the company's chair.2 Rosen indicated that his venture capital 
firm wanted Compaq to have a separate chair and CEO because "the 
chairman does have a lot more power than just another outside director, 
and when the chairman and chief executive officer are the same person, 
the board is often dominated by the C.E.O."260 
Between 1983 and 1991, Joseph R. Canion, Compaq's founder, served 
as the company's president and chief executive officer.261 Between 
1983 and 1990, Compaq performed exceptionally well. Compaq's 
annual sales increased from $111.2 million in 1983 to $3.6 billion in 
1990.262 Moreover, Compaq's net income increased from $4.7 million 
in 1983 to $454.9 million in 1990.263 As a result, the value of the 
shares owned by Compaq shareholders increased from $109.1 million in 
1983 to $1.9 billion in 1990.264 
In 1991, however, Compaq suffered a series of setbacks. For the first 
time in its history, Compaq's annual sales decreased.265 Moreover, 
because Compaq's products cost more to produce than those of many of 
its competitors,266 the company's annual net income decreased by 
$320.1 million in 1991.267 When Rosen, who was Compaq's chair and 
a member of the board's compensation, audit, and nominating commit-
258. COMPAQ CoMPUTER CORP., 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1984). 
259. Id. See also Byrne & Melcher, supra note 107, at 84 (Compaq cited as having 
the fourth best board in the United States). 
260. Steve Lohr, Pulling Down the Corporate Clubhouse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
1992, § 3, at 5. 
261. COMPAQ COMPUTER CoRP., 1990 PROXY STATEMENT 2 (1990); Catherine 
Arnst et al., Compaq: How It Made Its Impressive Move Out of the Doldrums, Bus. 
WK., Nov. 2, 1992, at 146. 
262. COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP,, supra note 258 at 15; COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP., 
1990 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1991). 
263. COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP., supra note 258, at 15; COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP., 
1990 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1991). 
264. COMPAQ CoMPUTER CORP,, supra note 258, at 14; COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP,, 
1990 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1991). 
265. COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1992). 
266. Id. at 5. 
267. Id. at 17. 
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tees,268 became aware of the company's problems, he began to discuss 
and investigate them with other board members.269 Although Rosen 
and Compaq's other board members reached the conclusion that the 
company needed to undergo a significant number of changes to continue 
to be successful, Compaq's management disagreed and thought that the 
company was merely facing «a short term perturbation." 270 
In October of 1991, after the board realized that it did not agree with 
management's assessment of the situation, the board replaced Canion, 
the company's popular CEO and president, with Eckhard Pfeiffer,271 
who was formerly Compaq's chief operating officer and an instrumental 
figure of the success of the company's European operations.272 
Pfeiffer "redirected the company's product strategy, marketing strategy, 
and ... cost-cutting strategy."273 After Pfeiffer implemented these 
strategic changes at Compaq, the company's sales, profits, and market 
capitalization significantly increased.27 
Unlike its counteiparts at ADM, .MK, and GM, Compaq's board 
forced management to make the changes necessary for the company to 
be successful without waiting for the situation to become a crisis. As 
Compaq's chair, Rosen played a significant role in the board's decision 
to investigate and ameliorate the problems that resulted in the company's 
disappointing sales, profits, and market capitalization in 1991. If 
Compaq had allowed a single individual to serve as its CEO and chair, 
frs board might not have been able to act so quickly and decisively.175 
268. Id. at 52. 
269. MONKS & MINow, supra note 195, at 159. 
270. Id. 
271. Following this announcement, Compaq's stock price declined by approximately 
13.6% over the next two days. However, the termination announcement crune only one 
day after the company announced its first-ever quarterly loss. Thomas C. Hayes, 
Compaq Ousts Chief After Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at 33. Compaq's 
announcement of a quarterly loss generated bad publicity regarding the company m the 
following days. See, e.g., Louise Kehoe, Compaq's Ousted CEO a Scapegoat?, FIN. 
POST, Oct. 29, 1991, at IO. 
272. Bob Francis, Compaq's New CEO: A Focus on Price, DATAMATION, Jan. 1, 
1992, at 37. 
273. MONKS & MINow, supra note 195, at 159. 
274. COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1993). 
275. For a comparison of the performance of Compaq versus IntematronaJ Business 
Machines ("IBM'') and Digital Equipment (''Digital'j, see infra Exhibit III, APPENDIX. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Although it would be extreme to refer to all directors as 11non-
performing assets," the label Robert Monks used to describe the directors 
of Sears, Roebuck in a full-page ad in The Wall Street Journal 
recommending a vote in favor of a variety of shareholder froposals 
(including one to separate the roles of CEO and chair),21 there is 
clearly room for improvement in the boardroom. By requiring boards 
of directors to consider on a yearly basis whether it would be desirable 
to split the roles of CEO and chair or to appoint a lead director, the 
adoption of our proposal would encourage CEOs and directors to focus 
on the strengths and weaknesses of their board leadership structure. We 
believe that many boards will conclude that there are substantial benefits 
to splitting the roles or appointing a lead director. These include the 
empowerment of the independent directors through the appointment of 
a recognized leader who will guide their regular evaluation of the CEO 
and his or her perfurmance277 and encourage free and open discussions 
about current problems, practices, and strategies. Yet, our proposal 
permits boards to keep a unitary CEO-chair structure without a lead 
director, provided the board explains its rationale to the shareholders in 
the proxy statement. 
Because we believe the arguments for a separate CEO and chair or 
lead director are compelling, we expect that boards providing for neither 
may :find it difficult to explain their reasoning to shareholders. Unable 
to defend current practice, directors may conclude that modifying that 
practice is the only solution. If so, our proposal may provide the 
impetus necessary to overcome CEO resistance to a change in board 
leadership structure that will reduce the CEO's power over the 
board.178 
276. WALL ST. J., May 8, 1992, at A7. 
277. For a useful discussion of how to conduct a successful CEO performance 
evaluation, see National Association of Corporate Directors, Report of the NACD Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Performance Evaluation of Chief Executive Officers, Boards, and 
Directors 1·5 (1994). See also James E. Sailer, CEO Evaluation at Dayton Hudson, 
Harvard Business School Case No. N9-491-I 16, March 28, 1991. 
278. Shareholder groups in the U.K. strongly support the LSE disclosure 
requirement because they believe that companies that are otherwise reluctant to comply 
with the Cadbucy Report's Code of Best Practice are embarrassed into compliance by 
the requirement to publicly state whether they are in compliance and, if not, why not. 
Cohen. supra note 29, at 19. 
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Our proposal talces full advantage of the desire of human beings to be 
approved of and respected.279 Public identification of the person who 
is charged with leading the independent directors will give the chair or 
lead director extra incentive to avoid the embarrassment and loss of 
reputational capital that will follow if the CEO runs amuck or the 
company otherwise performs badly on that person's watch. In short, by 
encouraging boards to select publicly identified leaders, we hope to shift 
the balance of power in the boardroom from the CEO to the independent 
directors, and to thereby improve corporate accountability. 
We acknowledge that selectin~ a separate chair or a lead director is no 
panacea for all corporate ills. 80 Even if a director is nominally 
independent of the CEO, as the outside directors of Morrison Knudsen 
were, social ties and the general desire to avoid being characterized as 
overly contentious or disruptive cause most directors to be loathe to 
challenge the CEO. RJR Nabisco, for example, had a separate 
chair-Charles E. Hugel, then CEO of Combustion Engineering-but 
CEO F. Ross Johnson still wasted corporate funds and tried to buy RJR 
with a lowball bid.281 Nonetheless, as we saw with Compaq, having 
a publicly identified leader of the independent directors increases the 
likelihood that the independent directors will hold the CEO accountable 
and promote such changes in corporate strategy and direction as might 
be needed to avoid a crisis. Such mid-course corrections can not only 
malce major loss of shareholder wealth less likely, but also prevent the 
devastating dislocation to employees, communities, and suppliers that 
often accompanies poor corporate performance.282 
It is ironic that the United States, which in many ways started the 
current corporate governance movement in 1976 with a letter from the 
279. SeeTetlock, supra note 51, at 308 ("There are many reasons why people seek 
the approval and respect of those to whom they are accountable, including both symbolic 
psychological and tangible material rewards and punishments.''). See also the comments 
of Ira Millstein in Laura Fowlie, Executive Firings a "Watershed," FJN. POST, Feb. 9, 
1993, at 6 ("[fhe boards of Westinghouse, IBM, and American Express] are acting 
because their reputations, their pride, their fellowship and their self respect cfemand iL"). 
280. See Dobrzynski, supra note 35, at 124 ("Splitting the jobs of chairman and 
CEO is no panacea.''). 
281. Id. See also BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: 
THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 73-74, 165 (1990). 
282. For a satirical but gut-wrenching depiction of the effect of the closing of the 
General Motors plant in Flint, Michigan, on former GM employees and the community, 
see the film RoGER AND ME (Warner Bros. Inc. 1989). 
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Chairman of the SEC to the newly appointed president of the New York 
Stock Exchange, proposing that the NYSE amend its listing requirements 
to require the appointment of audit committees comprised solely of 
independent directors,283 has now fallen behind the U.K. and Canada. 
We encourage the SEC, the NYSE, and the NASD to regain the 
initiative by examining board leadership structure as well as other 
aspects of corporate governance, such as how directors are selected,284 
evaluated,285 and compensated. 
283. Letter from Roderick M. Hills to William Batten (May 11, 1986) (on file with 
authors). 
284. See NACD Blue Ribbon Commission, supra note 34, at 7-14, for guidelines 
on selection of directors. 
285. The NACD Blue Ribbon Commission has adopted guidelines for the evaluation 
of boards and directors. Id. at 15---19. 
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